Growth
Academy

Lecture notes

Day 5

Lectures from Chicago, Friday, July 31, 2026.

Chicago

2 lectures

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Lecture 1

The Paradox of Innovation Institutions: Designing Flexible Ecosystems that Accelerate Discovery, Invention, and Growth

A lecture by James Evans

Max Palevsky Professor and Director of the Knowledge Lab, University of Chicago.

The bottom line

Knowing and inventing are collective productions, and discovery rarely arrives by leaps. Researchers, firms, and whole countries move locally across a space of adjacencies set by the labs, skills, and partners they already have. That is why AI's default effect is to make search more conservative, but the same tools, deliberately repurposed, can map and rewire overlooked adjacencies, letting an innovation system reach discoveries it would otherwise never bump into.

Innovation moves through adjacencies, not leaps

Discovery is almost never the work of a lone mind. Scientists take others' data, borrow explanations, and hand predictions to agencies that can act. The natural unit of "complex power," then, is often the national innovation system, a set of research and development organizations whose relationships form meaningful adjacencies that are hard to jump-start where they are absent.

Modeling this space shows why. Placing a year's ideas, methods, and keywords into a high-dimensional manifold and letting it evolve by local (Brownian) motion predicts the next year's discoveries with about 95% discrimination. Progress is not random everywhere; it is locally random, a lab bumps into the method next door, not one across the space, because it lacks the equipment, supply chain, or partners to reach further. The rare exceptions matter enormously: Einstein's 1905 papers, built by reflecting on others' experiments, are so anomalous precisely because roughly 98% of new discoveries are driven by new methods and data. The improbable jumps are few, yet they are effectively the only ones that reshape a field.

Adding people to the model sharpens the point. Modeling researchers as random walks through the same space (who works with whom, on which problem, using which method) predicts which person will make a given materials-science discovery with a precision near 0.5, out of some 20,000 candidates, simply because they sit between a problem and its solution. Scaled to universities and countries, the same logic predicts whether a discovery lands in the United States, Germany, or China, so the task is not only to recruit great scientists but to build systems that make the right adjacencies possible.

The paradox: AI conservatizes by default

Large language models are less like individual minds than like complex institutions: cultural and social technologies that internalize the diversity and biases of the corpora they learn from. Reasoning models make this literal, trained by rewarding self-talk that reaches correct answers, they spin up on average three internal personas that debate, disagree, and prune bad ideas, and turning up a single "surprise" feature can double performance out of the box. A frontier system can be a society of hundreds of underlying models, which is why even its builders cannot fully anticipate where it will go.

The catch is that, left to their default use, these tools narrow rather than widen search. On average, people using AI fill in the missing cells of what is already known, a conservative move that shrinks the space of open questions as everyone converges on the same regions. Because models are tuned to be helpful, agreeable, and balanced, users surrender cognitive agency: on genuinely new problems they perform worse yet feel more confident. Yet the same technology, pointed differently, becomes a detector of the improbable. AI can identify where researchers are not looking, gaps created not by nature but by boundaries between fields and between the academy and industry, and simulate pathways that cross them, improving the discovery of energy-relevant materials and the repurposing of drugs, with effects larger still when validated experimentally with Argonne National Laboratory.

Evidence at a glance

  • Local motion predicts discovery. A manifold of a year's ideas evolving by local randomness discriminates real from plausibly random next-year papers at about 95%.
  • Position beats brilliance. Modeling people as walks through the knowledge space predicts the discoverer of a given material with precision near 0.5 among roughly 20,000 people.
  • Distance pays later. A distant hit (like a new photovoltaic material) often underperforms nearby work at first but opens a neighborhood with a higher ceiling; a small British firm's polyester proved about as valuable as DuPont's entire space of nylon polymers.
  • Reasoning is a conversation. Reasoning models generate internal dialogue at about 600% enrichment, averaging three debating personas rather than one.

Designing flexible ecosystems

Weaken memory; widen search. Trapped systems fail not for lack of talent but because incumbents, legacy institutions, and default AI all reinforce the paths already taken. The policy task is to keep idea and capital markets dynamic enough that new adjacencies can form.

  • Fund the young and the architectural. Older scientists and mature firms tend to swap one component for another; young researchers and start-ups rewire whole systems across the economy. Unleash capital and idea markets for the disruptive bets incumbents avoid.
  • Do not import other countries' logjams. Big consolidating teams and institutions run by past winners build up memory that weakens search, avoid replicating them.
  • Concentrate deliberately, then bridge. Distributing narrow "centers of excellence" everywhere destroys the local adjacencies between disciplines and with industry; concentrate expertise regionally and connect it across sector boundaries, using AI-drawn maps of overlooked spaces to stage risky convenings that should sometimes fail.
  • Invest in your own problems. Health and technology needs differ by country; imported solutions can misfire, as when fluid resuscitation for sepsis, based on a small 1940s study, was followed for 60 years before a global trial showed it was harming children and the under-40s.

Lecture 2

AI for Development: The Case of Digital Agriculture

A lecture by Michael Kremer

University Professor in Economics and the College and the Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago; Director, Development Innovation Lab.

The bottom line

AI holds tremendous potential to advance development, but realizing it will rarely happen on its own: the biggest gains lie in applications where commercial incentives are weak, so complementary public investment is decisive. AI weather forecasts for smallholder farmers show the pattern, open, accurate, and cheap models deliver value only when paired with careful message design, trusted local data, and the institutions to reach farmers at scale.

AI for development: promise and the missing complements

Amid understandable concern about AI's risks, the more tractable question for this room is how to invest now to realize its potential across low- and middle-income countries, in small enterprises, education, health, and public-sector accountability. Frontier-lab models are important, but their benefits often require complementary investments where there is no strong commercial return. That is precisely where public policy has a role: either to incentivize firms to enter or to fund the work directly.

Digital agriculture illustrates the logic concretely, and AI weather forecasts illustrate it best. In rain-fed systems the central decision is when to plant. Planting just after the rains begin maximizes the growing season, but acting on a false start wastes seed and fertilizer and can destroy the crop. Farmers therefore hedge, plant late, and accept lower yields, a problem worsened by climate change, which erodes traditional rules of thumb, and by the historical neglect of tropical climates in meteorology. Evidence reviewed through the Development Innovation Lab's Innovation Commission is clear: across roughly half a dozen randomized trials and strong observational studies, farmers who receive forecasts change what and when they plant and how much they invest overall.

The forecasting leap, and the delivery problem

An AI revolution has transformed the supply of forecasts. Many institutions now release global models as open access, so any country can download and adapt them; they run about 80,000 times faster than the supercomputer-bound dynamical models only a few centers in North America and Europe could once afford. In India, a blend of AI models, including systems from Google and the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, with a statistical model of historical rainfall predicted monsoon onset best, and adding a physics-based model did better still. Yet these systems are not yet optimized for smallholders, because the commercial return to serving them is small.

A good forecast is worthless if farmers cannot use it. Working with Precision Development and the Government of India, the team distributed probabilistic forecasts and tested how to phrase them, finding, for example, that "70% likelihood" was misread as 70 millimetres of rain until rewritten as "70 out of 100." Katie Cowell, a weather scientist with the Human-Centered Weather Forecast Initiative, stressed that this demands an interdisciplinary team, farmer focus groups, and trusted local observations. In Ethiopia, where mountains make forecasting hard, the group blends rain-gauge climatology the Ethiopian Weather Service trusts with an AI system it can now run on its own hardware, then converts grid-cell outputs into the sub-district boundaries farmers actually recognize.

Evidence at a glance

  • Farmers act on forecasts. A study in Pakistan found farmers retimed applications around heavy or light rain; an Indian onset forecast changed timing, crop choice, and total investment.
  • Large, cheap returns. A Benin study with intensive in-person training found gains up to $350 per farmer; when India scaled forecasts, the cost was pennies per farmer, implying benefit-cost ratios that could easily exceed 100.
  • Blends beat single models. Combining AI and statistical (and then physics-based) models produced well-calibrated probabilities, with the blend outperforming each component.
  • Scaling worked. Distributed widely for the first time in 2025, the forecast alone predicted an unusual monsoon pause; in 2026 the program reached 50 million farmers.

What it takes to scale

AI can do a lot, but only with complements. The forecast is the easy part. Trusted data, tested messages, delivery channels, and the institutions to sustain them are what turn an accurate model into higher productivity.

  • Use weather as the entry point. Farmers check the weather constantly, so it is the natural hook onto which soil-chemistry advice, pest alerts, and other digital-agriculture services can be added over time.
  • Fund the public-good gap. Multilateral development banks are moving in, the Asian Development Bank has announced $300 million for farmer weather forecasts and the Inter-American Development Bank a similar effort, and can spread lessons across countries and regions.
  • Guard against overfitting. With many predictors and few once-a-year outcomes, models can look accurate yet fail in the field; governments procuring forecasts need transparency about fit rather than a simple "who predicts best" contest.
  • Reform procurement and evaluation. Rules that focus on price suit hardware, not software, where quality matters; and rapidly changing technology demands new ways to evaluate impact.
  • Pair humans with tools. As in structured-pedagogy teacher coaching, LLMs can help translate technical advisories into farmer-friendly messages, but adoption is highest when technology is combined with human contact.
The University of ChicagoBecker Friedman Institute for EconomicsWorld Bank Group Institute for Economic Development